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PART II 
 
Applications and Implications of Inductive Risk 
 
“Our eyes see nothing backward. A hundred times a day we mock our neighbors, 
and detest in others certain defects which are much more apparent in us; yea, and 
marvel at them with heedlessness and audacity…. Oh, importunate presumption!” 
– Michel de Montaigne1 
 
Chapter Three 
 
Enemy in the Mirror: The Need for Comparative Fundamentalism 
 
In Part II of this book our focus largely shifts from the unwieldy but diagnostically useful 
concept of religious luck to that of moral and intellectual risk. Of course, risky doxastic 
strategies, or what in the literature are often called belief-forming functions, may be a rather 
special concern; they do not illuminate all aspects of religious orientation. But people’s penchant 
for inductively risky inference inside the religious domain indicate for psychologists and 
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religious studies scholars a useful means of measuring the degree of fideistic commitment 
characteristic of a particular religious grouping. This can be determined along a scale from 
minimally to strongly fideistic. Risk-based measures allows for a more direct focus on the degree 
of fideistic orientation. They also enable psychologists to study the ways in which strong fideism 
with an agent making judgments that ‘mirror’ known personal and social biases.  
The questions I will suggest to expand fundamentalist orientation scales and give them 
broader comparative grip are questions about the connections between strong fideism and risk 
tolerance. From our theoretical background in Part I, we might reasonably hope to formulate not 
only new research questions, but also new scales and measures that help cognitive and social 
psychologists measure the degree of fideistic orientation displayed by religious subjects, or 
inherent in the particular conceptions of faith (theological methods) they adhere to. So one 
central thesis of Part II is that the concept of inductive risk I propose helpfully operationalizes 
radically asymmetric trait-ascriptions. My thesis is that the inductive riskiness of religious 
doxastic methods that individuals use, or that are prescribed by different models of faith, 
helpfully operationalizes the broader social scientific, philosophical, moral, and theological 
interest that people may have with problems of religious luck. Accordingly, we will speak less 
about luck in Part II, and more about specific markers of high inductive risk and their complex 
relationship to the study of human biases.  
  In this chapter and Chapter 4, my special focus is on the need for comparative 
fundamentalism (hereafter CF), and on how a better inductive risk ‘toolkit’ can empower its 
development.2 I explain why an empirically-informed study of inductively risky patterns of 
inference on the part of agents allows for a significant expansion of the scales used by 
psychologists to study religious orientation, and most especially fundamentalist orientation. We 
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will take time to carefully describe the thesis of psychological fideism, the distinction between 
psychological and religious fideism, and the different ways that this distinction is important for 
social scientists, philosophers, and theologians.3 Psychological (descriptive) fideism is an 
explanatory thesis, and one that can be tested and continually revised. Chapter 6 develops certain 
aspects of it by asking about connections between our own focus on counter-inductive thinking, 
and research in CSR focused on the appeal of minimally counter-intuitive religious ideas. If our 
application of the inductive risk account in Part II help to connect the study of fundamentalist 
orientation and with more general work in CSR, then one result should be that philosophers, 
psychologists and theologians should all find overlapping interests in the violation of inductive 
norms, just as I hope, after Part I that they all find interest some connections to their own field in 
problems of religious luck. 
Understanding and predicting religious radicalization is important to whatever resources we 
have for responding to it. Whitehouse and McQuinn (2013) bring additional theory to help 
analyze religious radicalization in the form of DMR theory, or divergent modes of religiosity. It 
highlights that the more severe or risky are the requirements for entry into a group identity, the 
greater the greater the liking or emotional connection with group members.4 But beyond 
prediction and control, what about risk and doxastic responsibility with respect to such attitudes? 
How will we develop our inductive risk account of the limits of reasonable religious 
disagreement? That is a normative and philosophical question. Developing this normative or 
philosophical side of the inductive risk account is the second central thesis of Part II.  
In developing this side of the inductive risk account concerned with guidance, we must 
endeavour to keep psychology and censure/critique of strong fideism and of fundamentalist 
orientation, properly separated. Psychological fideism deserves to be studied, but morally risky 
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belief that exhibits markers of bias mirroring, I argue, deserves censure. So morally risky belief 
(and however explained theologically) deserves censure. This is to say that my de jure argument 
against theological defences of the reasonableness of an exclusivist response to religious 
contrariety, as it will be developed further in Part II and especially in the arguments of Chapter 5, 
is a philosophical thesis. It is based on moral, logical, and epistemological concerns, even though 
it draws heavily upon psychological studies. Remembering this we can boost the strength of our 
de jure argument by making it more “proper.” Chapter 6, while it focuses on CSR and is mostly 
concerned with the first side of the project, also clarifies my critique of religious exclusivism and 
attendant apologetic strategies by examining more directly the relationship between de jure and 
de facto objections. The result of development and application of the inductive risk account’s 
normative side should ideally be this. The reader agrees with me that reasonability and doxastic 
responsibility are closely tied, and that while there are many permissive of faith ventures, The 
exclusivist response to religious multiplicity does not deserve to be given a free pass as 
reasonable, nor is what Griffith’s describes as “polemical apologetics” among exclusivist 
religions or sects reasonable disagreement.5 
 
From Philosophy of Luck to an Inductive Risk Toolkit 
Enlightenment philosophes who contributed to the rebirth of toleration were generally 
concerned not with all forms of religiosity, but with what they called “religious enthusiasm,” 
which they took to be manifested cross-denominationally. This is as much to say that 
comparative philosophy must strive to understand fundamentalism’s varied forms through more 
careful attention both to particulars about distinct sects, and to formally common features within 
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and between whole families of religion. Fundamentalist orientation is not only –I daresay not 
nearly– so much a matter of what is believed, as about how religious beliefs and moral rules are 
taken up and maintained; these recurring patterns are best studied comparatively.6  
There have been a number of fundamentalism scales put to use in psychology, and our 
project of explaining the value of measures connected with moral and epistemic risk will try to 
build off of these. Until recently few such scales aimed to be comparative enough to work even 
with populations across the Abrahamic religions. Fortunately, there are now scales aimed at 
illuminating the “multi-dimensionality” of fundamentalist religiosity, scales which provide better 
comparison across religious affiliations.7 Jose Liht, Sarah Savage and their research team, for 
example, approach comparison within Abrahamic religions by identifying seven areas 
symptomatic of the tension between traditional religiosity and modernity. Like Altemeyer and 
Hunsberger (2004), Liht, Savage and their colleagues take a sensible approach to establishing 
scales that support cross-cultural or comparative study of fundamentalism. Consulting with 
experts from the three Abrahamic faiths in order to ensure the face and construct validity of the 
scale, these researchers went on to design multiple items (questions, half pro-trait, half anti-trait) 
for each of these seven areas: 
 
1. Protection of revealed traditions versus rational criticism 
2. Heteronomy versus autonomy and relativism 
3. Traditionalism versus progressive religious change 
4. Sacralization versus secularization of the public arena 
5. Secular culture perceived as a threat versus secular culture embraced 
6. Pluralism versus religious centrism 
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7. Millennial-Messianic imminence versus prophetic skepticism. 
What the authors term their Multi-Dimensional Fundamentalism Inventory (MDFI) addresses 
attitudes and group dynamics, and not just beliefs. But while it appears to be a substantial 
improvement over older scales, from the approach we are taking, few of the items engage very 
directly with characteristic patterns of inference and their inherent riskiness. Only #1 and #6 
begin to get at how people reason when they ascribe traits and explain differences between 
religious insiders and outsiders. If psychologists take my suggestion to be well-motivated and 
feasible, then one important result would be to establish more direct connections between current 
research programmes in psychology of religion and philosophy. 
We will return to these concerns about how philosophy or luck/risk might enable more 
accurate and useful scales of fideistic orientation later in this chapter and the next. But as a more 
general methodological point, there are likely to be different understandings of problems of 
religious luck, and different views on their philosophical and theological implications. My 
expressed purpose is to improve our ability to understand and respond to fundamentalist 
religiosity, but this may well differ from the use that others want to make of problems of 
religious luck, either philosophically or theologically. The safety-based concerns for faith-based 
belief can cut a number of ways: against knowledge, truth, rationality, or moral responsibility. 
Our normative concern in this book is primarily with the limits of reasonable disagreement, and 
so with this narrowed purpose in mind we should avoid getting sidetracked onto other issues 
about epistemic status that might lead us astray.8 I do not want to say a lot about its implications 
beyond its contributions to CF, since as noted earlier I have no strong thesis to promote in 
respect to the debate between theists, atheists, and principled agnostics over the truth of theism.  
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Similarly we don’t want to go astray by confusing our de jure challenge targeting salvific 
exclusivism with a different kind of challenge, a de facto challenge. 
Salvific exclusivism is one of the attitudes characteristic of fundamentalists of different 
faith traditions. Faultless disagreement does not occur under conditions of self-deception, and so 
the inductive risk account says that we should not take it as occurring under conditions of 
counter-inductive thinking. Ways of acquiring or maintaining a belief dependent upon apparent 
violations of inductive norms are far from faultless, and the beliefs of agents who rely on such 
methods are especially exposed to serious etiological challenge. 
Returning to our main topic, the first question that this chapter should propose in 
connection with CF is, “Can counter-inductive thinkers come to recognize their mirror images?” 
The “enemy in the mirror” is a metaphor which researchers of comparative fundamentalism and 
religious radicalization have sometimes used to describe a concern of special interest.9 On the 
view to be developed, the enemy in the mirror is a direct consequent of counter-inductive 
thinking when applied to a multiplicity of narrative testimonial traditions. This Enemy in the 
Mirror Phenomenon (EMP) will be a technical term for our study, as this will aid our attempt to 
explain in the next section how religious contrariety arises on the basis of etiological symmetries. 
The final section brings the discussion back around to our de jure challenge to religious 
exclusivist response to religious multiplicity. There I distinguish two forms of exclusivism that 
we find defended in the literature, particularist exclusivism and mutualist exclusivism, and I 
present a dilemma that aims to expose the serious inconsistencies of each. 
Those of fundamentalist orientation tend to identify certain fundamentals of the faith and 
elevate these to absolutes. Of course, I have not claimed that fideism is rendered extreme only by 
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engendering exclusivist attitudes about religious truth or salvation. It can also be rendered 
extreme in other ways, for example by placing faith into conflict with reason; by conflating 
subjective or psychological certitude with objective justification or warrant; by engaging in 
purely ‘negative’ apologetics, by distaining philosophy and science, or using them only in an ad 
hoc manner; by asserting that non-believers should live under the yoke of divine command, 
Sharia law, or an institutionalized religious authority –a theocratic state. Like “religion,” 
“fundamentalism” is a family-relations concept, a concept with multiple aspects such that 
manifesting different combinations of these aspects may be sufficient to fall under the 
description. Religious fundamentalism identifies ways of reasoning that go beyond 
conservativism and orthodoxy.  
Religious fundamentalism has forms that arguably can be active in all religions. Yet the 
common characteristics of fundamentalism, including especially exclusivist attitudes about 
religious truth and salvation are features of some religions, and some models of faith, more so 
than others.10 The need for scales that measure a propensity among religious subjects for 
inductively risky doxastic strategies is our main concern, but of course in the broader context of 
CF, I am only arguing that the markers of inductive risk be recognized as one marker of religious 
extremism among others.11 Psychological (descriptive) fideism is a thesis about how affective 
elements impact how people understand faith and the particular commitments faith binds one 
to.12 It does not presuppose that people are always self-aware, as writers like James and 
Kierkegaard most clearly are, about the influence of emotion or affect and related extra-
evidential factors over what religious or theological statements they accept as true.  Getting clear 
about the thesis of psychological fideism is important, because it can be the basis for predictions 
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of characteristic ways of thinking. I argue that inductive risk gives definition to the thesis of 
descriptive fideism as a working hypothesis in the science of religions.  
In “Faith and the Right to Believe,” William James defines faith tendencies, for the purposes 
of an empiricist approach that might aid development of a science of religion, as “extremely active 
psychological forces, constantly outstripping evidence.” Let’s call this James’ psychological 
fideism; it is his claim that the psychological dynamics of religious faith, as studied through its 
‘characters’ and ‘varieties,’ integrally involve the will or the passional nature of human agents. 
This descriptive fideism is best illustrated in what James termed the ‘faith-ladder’ and its 
progressive rungs or steps: 
1. There is nothing absurd in a certain view of the world being true, nothing self-
contradictory;  
2. It might have been true under certain conditions;  
3. It may be true, even now;  
4. It is fit to be true;  
5. It ought to be true;  
6. It must be true;  
7. It shall be true, at any rate true for me.  
Famous for a “subjective method” he shared with Kierkegaard’s, James’ ethics of belief is 
often criticized for its radical level of permission to believe that which fulfills certain needs for 
meaning and value in life, even when undermined by evidence. While I am a permissivist, I think 
that James presented a too one-sided an account of the “courage” and “caution” principles with 
regard to faith-based “doxastic ventures.” But my main point here is that James is quite correct, 
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descriptively, that epistemic risk in religious assent, whatever doxastic attitudes we ascribe to it. 
The “faith ladder,” as James terms it, crosses the philosopher’s division between “Is” and “Ought” 
claims, and from an analytical perspective is “no logical chain of inferences.” But the agent’s 
perspective is often far from an analytical perspective, and psychological fideism needs to be 
carefully distinguished in a science of religion from religious fideism.13 One can’t properly address 
the question of one’s ‘right’ to believe (or the limits to that right), without accepting something 
like the faith-ladder’s psychological descriptions of how the believer – especially the believer of 
fundamentalist orientation – typically reasons.14 Psychological fideism should therefore also be 
distinguished from any religious apologetic strategy or theological, and from any thesis bearing 
directly on the ethics of belief. One cannot properly address the question of one’s ‘right’ to believe 
(or the limits to that right), without accepting something like the faith-ladder’s psychological 
descriptions of how the believer typically reasons.15 A skeptic could accept it as well as a theist, 
though these two radically disagree about what a person should believe. It was quite evident to 
James that faith tendencies are value-charged schemes of thought; religious cognition not only 
reveals leaps from ought-to-be to is, and from might be true to is true, systematic theology often 
wears such leaps on its sleeve. So how ironic it must have seemed to James that that almost in 
inverse proportion to the strength of a person’s fideistic orientation, they tend to try to ‘sink the 
fact’ of the evidential underdetermination of what James aptly termed their religious “overbeliefs.” 
For how could James, a forger of the fields of empirical psychology and of East/West comparative 
philosophy of religion, not acknowledge how religious characters habitually “live upon the faith-
ladder”?  
One reason for favoring the concept of inductive risk in our approach to religious 
epistemics is that, since this concept is a well-recognized concern in science policy decision-
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making, any ability to carry it over to philosophy of religion opens up some methodological 
parallels between theological and scientific reasoning. Being a proponent of the Dialogue Model 
of the relationship between science and religion, this is something I would like to encourage. The 
risk of getting it wrong, we all recognize, is potentially a moral as well as epistemological risk. 
Risk-management is as much an issue for the limits of reasonable religious faith ventures as it is 
for decision-making over practical affairs. For our study it, the concept of “reasonableness” is 
not given to any pet theory of evidence; our use of the concept relate it to lack of 
blameworthiness, as responding to both epistemic and ethical norms. Any agent’s doxastic 
method that is inductively risky from a non-religiously committed standpoint marks itself as a 
potential target for criticism, or what we will call censure. The more so as other persons are done 
an epistemic injustice by it, censure of the agent’s doxastic responsibility may range over moral 
as well as epistemological concerns. Any of the markers of religious fundamentalism noted 
above can be considered from the perspective of risk that one person or group’s faith venture 
may affect others in adverse ways.  
Arguably, that fundamentalist faith ventures risk others in ways that more moderate 
religious faith ventures do not, is as clearly observable as that, in game theory, defectors risk 
cooperators, while cooperators do not similarly risk defectors. In Tragedy of the Commons, for 
example, the cooperators do not really risk others, because their choices aim for the best 
available outcome for everyone. But a defector by contrast makes choices that, in order to 
maximize personal (or group) gain, severely risks destruction of the goods of broader trust and 
cooperation. The non-cooperators are often studied in game theory as following strategies that 
impede the social evolution of cooperation. Why isn’t the logic of fundamentalist religiosity 
analogous to this sort of asymmetry exhibited by defectors?16 Why shouldn’t the habits of 
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inference descriptive of Barthian fideism be studied in light of game theory, where the concept of 
a “magic circle” — a shielded but never fully self-enclosed space where normal rules and 
expectations as suspended —is central to a good deal of theory?17 
This suggests that responsible faith ventures are maintained only with awareness of and 
appropriate responsiveness to inductive risk. On the present account, the limits of responsible 
faith ventures are not set by any one type of adequacy that the religious agent recognizes, 
epistemic, moral, or theological, but by the agent’s recognition of each of these functioning 
through checks-and-balances on the other two.18 Permissible or virtuous faith ventures will thus 
be assured to be balanced between the courage of religious virtue and religious particularity, and 
the caution of independent or universal moral and intellectual virtue; they will be balanced 
between responsiveness not only to risk to one’s own person, but to risks that my faith venture 
might pose to others, physically, socially, or psychologically.  
Risk and responsibility are closely connected: The riskiness of one’s method of forming 
one’s religious beliefs is central not just to explanatory concerns in the psychology of religion, 
but also to normative concerns with the ethics of belief. For many kinds of harm, the exposure of 
others to it already constitutes the main de jure issue. An exposure to harm is already a harm in 
the placing on others an unconsenting risk. Permissivist accounts in the ethics of belief need to 
set the limits of reasonability: they need to have ‘teeth’ in the sense that moderate fideism and 
recognition of a fideistic minimum in all of our faith ventures, is the best corrective to 
immoderate or radical fideism. When they fail to do so, it is not a form of permissivism as I 
understand it. It is an apologetic strategy that ‘rides shotgun’ for religious absolutism by 
defending for the laity an unqualified steadfast response to peer disagreement: theological non-
accommodationism.  
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There are positions in the epistemology of disagreement that are self-described as 
dogmatist, and the proponents of this position are also proponents of religious particularism.19 
Dogmatism as a thesis is perhaps better described as mutualist impermissivism, than as 
permissivism. But we will examine it more closely in Chapter 4.20 People are not necessarily 
intellectually vicious for accepting nurtured beliefs and holding them without a great deal of 
reflection. But neither does such a permissivist account rationalize dogmatism or imply the 
reasonability, tout court, of holding to what we are taught. Permissionism should sharpen 
reasoned criticism rather than lead to its abandonment, and an inductive risk-focused account, as 
we will argue throughout this book, does much to show us how.21 
Responsible agency implies that we have moral reasons to monitor, modify and moderate 
how we think about disagreement with epistemic peers. In the broad domain of controversial 
views, bias-ascriptions may fly in both directions between proponents of competing systems of 
belief. Now ascribing error to another’s view can be a mark of respecting shared norms of 
rational criticism. Even doing so by attributing a bias to someone with whom one disagrees 
might be made honestly, in the hope that pointing out a bias will stimulate reflection on the part 
of that agent, and greater future habituation to critical reasoning dispositions. And not all 
ascription of error, or even of bias, is grounds for further ascription of culpability or blame. But 
the kind of metaphysical truth-declaration and peer denial we find on display in exchanges 
between aggressive atheists and religious fundamentalists draws courage from the persuasive 
appeal to informal fallacies such as genetic fallacy, psychologizing the other, appeal to 
ignorance, ad hominem, bandwagon, strawman, appeal to fear, etc.22 Employment of informal 
fallacies is certainly not praiseworthy, but the great difficulty humans have, cognitively and 
motivationally, with recognizing their own biases and trying to redressing them make doxastic 
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responsibility an especially difficult yet vital topic. I agree with Paul Thagard call for to avoid a 
long-standing conflation between “thinking” and argumentative “reasoning.” Taking a more 
empirically-informed approach, “[W]hen arguments fail to convince, we should rarely look for 
the explanation in terms of the traditional fallacies, but rather in terms of the multitude of error 
tendencies that psychological research has shown to operate in human thinking.”23 This is why a 
more general or domain-neutral review of personal and social biases is methodologically 
important to us. Evidence of bias supplies etiological information that may present a strong de 
jure challenge to a particular agent.  
Paradoxically perhaps, vice-charging can either be aimed at encouraging needed doxastic 
responsibility in the person so charged, or at insulating the vice-charger from criticisms of a 
similar sort directed at him by others. Peer denial in its most common form, as a dogmatic way to 
claim higher authority for one’s beliefs or values while insulating them from criticism, is 
something we see throughout the broader domain of controversial views. Those loudest voices in 
our culture wars over science and religion attribute bias to each other. Often they are both right, 
but it is ‘bunk de-bunking’ whenever the attribution of a bias functions like (or simply as) a 
circumstantial ad hominem argument. Ian Kidd suggests that to begin to approach the question of 
sound versus simply self-protective instances of vice-charging, we should distinguish two types. 
Rhetorical complaints contrast with robust charges, where only the latter qualify as legitimate 
modes of criticism:  
     A rhetorical vice charge involves an agent expressing a negative attitude, 
opinion, or evaluation of some other agent, whether expression is oral, literary, or 
bodily – a curt tweet, audible grown, eye-rolling, and so on. But, crucially, that 
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agent could not elaborate or ‘unpack’ the charge if asked to, for instance by 
explaining the reasoning that supports the negative judgment. Rhetorical charges 
involve reportage of one’s negative judgments, but not the presentation of any 
reasons, evidence, or feelings in support of them, so they do not do any real 
critical work….24 
Kidd’s condition on a rhetorical vice charge would need to be strengthened to apply to 
the manner in which religious apologists could and sometimes do engage in rhetorical vice-
charging. We will see examples of this later. But Kidd goes on to develop conditions of robust 
vice-charging. These require first a clear concept of epistemic responsibility, and so “should be 
sensitive to the etiology of vice and the ecological conditions of epistemic socialisation.”25 If 
evidence of irrelevant influence is sometimes evidence of error, rationality demands that the vice 
attributor not ignore it as a defeater to personal justification. Where contingency anxiety and 
attendant epistemic humility is appropriate yet lacking in the agent, we can hypothesize that 
unconscious motivations will be triggered to engage in confabulatory explanation.26 For virtue 
theorists like Kidd, Vainio (2017, discussed below) and myself, de-biasing means encouraging 
the shared resources of the moral virtues of open-mindedness and reciprocity, and of intellectual 
virtues of epistemic humility and intellectual fair-mindedness.27 We can disagree about what 
balance of reason and faith to recommend, and whether to weigh risk of error higher or lower 
than desire for truth. But without valuing and habituating ourselves to inductive norms, what a 
person advances as generalizations, analogies, and explanations that help us understand religious 
difference arguably has the character of a story, a mythos, not logos.  
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Fundamentalist Orientation and the Risks of Teleological Suspension 
Religious fundamentalism is a term for tendencies that can be studied comparatively. So is 
religious fideism. Both concepts must be understood descriptively as befits academic religious 
studies, without the pejorative connotation put on them in popular writing and the culture wars 
more generally.28 Connotations that condemn whatever is called fundamentalist religiosity do not 
encourage dialogue, and strawman characterizations always serve to enable equally over-simple 
‘that’s not us’ reposts. While religious radicalization and violence are a focus of keen concern by 
academics, these are not synonymous with fundamentalism, which some see as just a way of 
being religious no more harmful than any other.29 This however might be to over-generalize in 
the opposite direction. At the height of theological hostility is often found an apocalyptic 
narrative of cosmic war, a narrative which invokes a moral dualism splitting earthly and 
supernatural beings into two basic camps of the good and the evil. Apocalypse and religious 
utopia/dystopia (since what is utopia for insiders is typically dystopia for outsiders) are among 
the most extreme uses of religious imagination, and often play a role in religious radicalization. 
Personal psychologists have looked at “the genesis of the need to divide the world into rigidly 
polarized, warring camps … at the heart of religious fanaticism.”30 As Mark Juergensmeyer, a 
sociologist noted for his work on religion and violence puts it, “the religious imagination… has 
always had the propensity to absolutize and to project images of cosmic war. It has also much to 
do with the social tensions of this moment of history that cry out for absolute solutions, and the 
sense of personal humiliation experienced by men who long to restore an integrity they perceive 
as lost….”31  
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So my approach agrees with Malise Ruthven that “Whether or not we like the term, 
fundamentalist or fundamentalist-like movements appear to be erupting in many parts of the 
world [and] the phenomena it encompasses deserve to be analysed.” (6) Patterns of religious 
authority and leadership that characterize fundamentalism are, like “religion” itself, a matter of 
family relations. The concept of fundamentalism I deem to be quite legitimate, but are not well-
captured by a set a necessary conditions, since different combinations of features may be 
sufficient for describing one’s orientation as fundamentalist. What is clear is that 
fundamentalism has many forms, and that in some subset of those forms it gives rise to epistemic 
injustice, political and psychological harm, but only in extreme cases to a specific act of religious 
violence.32 There are numerous moral concerns that I believe make the comparative study of 
fundamentalism a pressing demand today. These moral concerns can briefly be broken down into 
three points.  
Firstly, fundamentalism threatens to cut off dialogue and the search for points of 
commonality, because it sees only the side of different, contradictory beliefs, not the side 
of common proximate causes and formal symmetries in the culturally nurtured manner of 
belief uptake. This neglect is indeed one of the clearest signs of unacknowledged 
similarity between fundamentalists of different sects. Trumping epistemological norms 
by ‘truth-first’ strategies can lead to an over-easy rejection of peerhood, and therefore 
also of the epistemic significance of religious disagreement. “Metaphysics is first 
philosophy” is the simple, pre-modern way of expressing a strong fideism, and of 
insulating a religious worldview from rational scrutiny even by religious insiders. For the 
average religious adherent who knows the narrative but is not a theologian, the effect 
may be that moral and epistemic concerns are discounted. What is taken as true 
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metaphysically is whatever is accepted through testimonial authority assumption, and the 
theological categories of the home religion.   
In On Religious Diversity, Robert McKim writes that “Members of religious 
traditions generally think that their tradition is superior to the competition. So they are 
committed to there being criteria of evaluation in virtue of which this is so.”33 This does 
not mean that folk religiosity has the character of religious rationalism, or adheres to the 
evidentialist maxim that ‘the wise proportion their belief to their evidence.’ It rather 
means that an evidentialist apologetic strategy is often adopted, on which ample reason 
and evidence are said to be available to justify the home religion’s theology, even though 
the actual basis of genuine faith is maintained not to be inference from evidence but as 
something more direct, and for the agent irresistible.34 But here of course the problems of 
circular reasoning and of the subjectivization of evidence sufficient to rationalize belief 
come to the fore. Chapter 2 briefly introduced (EGO), my version of an independence-
from-theory demand on reasons given in support of asymmetric attribution of religious 
truth or value to group insiders and outsiders. (EGO) says that ascribing differences to 
people needs to be supported with relevant difference reasoning, and it adds several 
constraints on this reasoning.35 Mainly it constrains us to appeal only to agent-level 
considerations to justify the ascription of an agent-level asymmetry: One ought to only 
appeal to epistemic considerations in justifying purported asymmetries of epistemic states 
and standings.  Rationalists, whether religious rationalists who believe God’s existence to 
be provable (a priori or a posteriori), or sceptical rationalists who set a high bar for 
rational belief and claim arguments for God’s existence do not meet that bar, agree on 
one thing: These rationalists agree that the beliefs we hold should be reasons-responsive, 
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and supportable by neutral or independent reason. Traditionally, fideistic orientation is by 
degrees suspicious of rationalism, and with it of natural theology and religion-specific 
evidentialism. Reason is to only as allowed to support but not to challenge first 
assumptions: philosophy as the handmaid of theology who must always deliver a happy 
ending. The more threatening that reason and science are taken to be to one’s faith, the 
more that the model of faith invites fundamentalist orientation, and with it a disregard of 
(EGO)’s norm of appealing to independent reasons to support one’s beliefs. 
A second well-motivated concern motivating the comparative study of fundamentalism is 
that it is a common denominator in cases of religious violence where there is what Kierkegaard 
describes as an agent’s “teleological suspension of the ethical.” A problem with acts of 
unconditional assent to an authority is the possibility of fanaticism, and fanaticism sometimes 
drives either taking divine commands as the final arbiter of moral justification, or appropriating 
religious authority in the name of violent means to one’s own ends. For those of us reliant on 
human modes of inquiry, such appeal to God to support, or even to motivate moral and epistemic 
divisions may be all that can be meant by ‘getting it wrong.’ The truths to which the believer 
assents are purportedly transcendent truths not open verification, or it seems to falsification. But 
this is a psychological fact: a decision on the part of the believer to accept certain tenets of faith 
as absolutes. Too often these contents, however, are identified as things culturally particular 
rather than culturally universal. As I ate lunch today, I read of a case where a recently radicalized 
Islamist yelling “God is great” stabbed a woman to death at a train stop in Marseilles, ran away, 
came back and stabbed a second woman who had gone to her aid, and when later soon thereafter 
confronted by police, charged at them as was shot. How is it that a just and great god authorizes 
or demands violence against countrymen and civilians? How is it that the surety of one’s 
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metaphysical beliefs as a guide to action supersede not just basic moral intuitions, but as it 
appears at least in cases of religious hate crimes such as this, any genuinely universal moral 
principles? If we do not want to be politically naïve, we should not discount how complex and 
varied the causes of radicalization are, and the extent to which religion may not be a primary 
driver, but sometimes only a pawn, of conflict between ethnic groups or political ideologies.36 
The politics of identity may involve numerous factors, and religious differences may be just one 
of these. But fundamentalism tends to breed ideologies that neglect private/public distinctions, 
and that are increasingly both religious and political in nature.37 The proximate causes of 
religious radicalization often involve highly selective interpretations and applications of a 
testimonial tradition’s religious virtues and teachings. The idea that if you had enough faith you 
would do God’s will without experiencing the moral dissonance between ones actions and 
universal moral principles like the Golden Rule, etc., is surely an idea of radical fideism: 
However counter-intuitive it is that a just God would demand the indifferent slaughter of 
innocents, if you had enough faith you would act on the (perceived) will of God and not demand 
independently good moral reasons.38 In this sense radical fideism is still closely associated with 
the “enthusiasm” or “fanaticism” that Enlightenment philosophes identified as driving back-and-
forth persecution between Catholics and Protestants.  
We see teleological suspension of the ethical in the biblical narrative in which Abraham 
responds to a perceived command to sacrifice his beloved son Isaac, quite the opposite of what 
any loving parent would want. The particularism of divine commands and their potential conflict 
with universal morality is seen in this same Biblical narrative since God, in treating Isaac merely 
as a tool in a test of Abraham’s faith, seems to act contrary not only to what one would think a 
just god would do, but also to the universal principle to treat others always as an end in 
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themselves and never merely as a means. Kierkegaard in his deep reflection on this Biblical 
passage in Fear and Trembling does not mention this latter point, but he does describe a 
teleological suspension as a subordination of the “universal” and the “particular.” In Fear and 
Trembling Kierkegaard writes, “The ethical as such is the universal, and as the universal it 
applies to everyone…” So in suspending the ethical, Abraham “acts by virtue of the absurd, for it 
is precisely absurd that he as the particular is higher than the universal…. By his act he 
overstepped the ethical entirely and possessed a higher telos outside of it, in relation to which he 
suspended the former.”39  
While teleological suspension of the ethical, in which the individual “becomes higher 
than the universal,” has garnered a great deal of critical attention, what seems to have gone 
unnoticed in philosophy of religion is that this same fideistic suspension can attach to the logical 
and epistemological as well. Religious virtues can as easily come undone from universal logical 
and epistemological norms just as they can from universal ethical norms. Each such divergence 
of religious from independently-recognizable moral or intellectual virtue holds its own danger 
with respect to facilitating religious extremism. Emil Brunner, an early post-liberal theologian 
like Barth, claims that “God takes over all responsibility for our action.”40 So later we will take 
time to elaborate this three-fold typology and identify psychological markers of these parallel 
concerns: teleological suspension of the ethics, the logical, and the epistemological. But briefly 
here, teleological suspension of the logical is an apt description of religious uniqueness 
maintained through counter-inductive thinking. Teleological suspension of the epistemological is 
an apt description of purely negative religious apologetics, and of at least some forms of an 
externalist or ‘basic belief’ apologetic. In many normal cases, the falsehood of a belief is 
consistent with its having been rationally held by an agent: Rationality is independent of truth, 
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but a good indication of what may responsibly be held to be true. But every instance where, if 
truth were to go missing, so would the agent’s warrant and rationality in assenting that belief, can 
plausibly be seen as an instance of teleological suspension of the epistemological. For here 
external warrant and internal rationality were never allowed their natural independence. They are 
never indicators of truth; rather, the faith-based assumption of truth or divine authority is 
employed as a guarantor of the warrant and rationality enjoyed by the true believer. 
My third point about moral concerns that makes the comparative study of 
fundamentalism a pressing demand today is that fundamentalism threatens to make religious 
toleration an ‘impossible virtue.’ The difficulty with tolerance as Bernard Williams wrote, is that 
it seems to be a necessary and yet on certain assumptions an impossible virtue:  
     It is necessary where different groups have conflicting beliefs — moral, 
political, or religious — and realize that there is no alternative to their living 
together, that is to say, no alternative except armed conflict, which will not 
resolve their disagreements and will impose continuous suffering. These are the 
circumstances in which toleration is necessary. Yet in those same circumstances it 
may well seem impossible.41  
To be sure, there can be good moral and pragmatic reasons for tolerating others even 
when we feel sure that their beliefs are erroneous or their ways of life are immoral. This may 
even be so in a situation where you are part of a religious majority that could impose 
paternalistic laws. Also, “intolerance” is difficult to characterize, and it surely is not the case that 
fundamentalists are all personally intolerant. We need to be careful here of course since the 
characterization of certain groups as intolerant is sometimes a result of one-sidedness in one’s 
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descriptions. But religious exclusivism and absolutism are two (among the multiple) marks of 
fundamentalist orientation, and those who argue that religious toleration is impossible are almost 
exclusively self-described exclusivists. There are clear logical connections between exclusivism 
and the “non-accommodation” of non-believers, at least soteriologically, in the doctrine of 
salvation if not also in the social sphere.  
We can leave it open just how ‘accommodating’ the reasonable accommodation of non-
believers should be. Part of the problem with this recognition may be that on assumption of 
religious absolutism and the one true sect or religion, the very idea of theological if not also 
moral and political compromise can appear counter to God’s plan. If you know the will of God, 
your duty is to see it enforced as you claim God intends it.42 But there is always an intellectual 
viciousness and an epistemic injustice done by the exclusivist in denying religious others as 
peers, and in not accommodating their virtue and reasonableness some reasonable way. 
But they do me wrong.  They do me… a great wrong in this, that they make the 
same words which accuse my infirmity, represent me for an ungrateful person… 
[and] from a natural imperfection, make out a deficit of conscience.                     
—Montaigne43 
 
Conclusion 
In Part I we saw that how far a theology, theodicy, or apologetic response to unbelievers to or 
religious multiplicity ‘leans of luck’ is a largely descriptive and readily assessable matter once 
one understands what they are looking. It helps greatly to have a working taxonomy of the 
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different types of religious luck ascriptions people make, and examples of debatable problems 
associated with each type. We said that Part II would work to apply Part I’s theory to religiosity 
in the wild by translating questions discussed among theologians and philosophers as problems 
of religious luck into more empirically approachable questions of degrees of epistemic risk, 
including especially the risk of getting it wrong in an inductive context of inquiry.  
So starting from what may most easily be tested for by psychologists, a test subject 
displaying dispositions toward counter-inductive thinking in the religious domain functions in 
my account as a key marker both of high doxastic risk toleration and of the strength of that 
individual’s fideistic orientation. This together with other measures on a scale of strength of 
fideistic orientation becomes, in turn, a revealing new marker of fundamentalist orientation. So 
these proposals are aimed at giving the scholarly study of fundamentalism more tools and greater 
comparative validity. This chapter has accordingly argued that new scales related to ingroup-
outgroup attitudes but focused on measuring propensities for inductively risky patterns of 
inference are what would provide interesting new and testable hypotheses in regard to 
fundamentalist orientation in particular. Scales for fideistic orientation and for fundamentalist 
orientation can be hypothesized to correlate to a high degree. A third possible scale, a scale for 
propensities to think counter-inductively, helps to tie these other two together; it potentially 
brings needed clarity to the scholarly study of religious fundamentalism and related areas such as 
the psychology of religious radicalization and religious violence. 
The inductive risk account holds that exhibiting comparatively risky doxastic methods 
indicates strongly fideistic orientation. But our discussion of bias studies in this chapter was 
quite general; we insisted only a) that personal and social biases affect many beliefs in domains 
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of controversial views, and b) that the domain of religious ideas is no exception to this general 
fact. But the ‘mirroring’ of known biases, as the next chapter will further elaborate, is important 
psychologically and philosophically. So the introduction to research on biases in this chapter is 
mainly background for the further development of our inductive risk account. Although these 
proposals may be quite sketchy and this point, we will continue to sharpen them in the next 
chapter, and especially in Chapter 6, which develops a number of more specific research 
questions, questions might also serve to more closely connect comparative fundamentalism (CF) 
and cognitive science of religions (CSR).44 
 
Notes to Chapter Three 
 
1 Montaigne, “Of the Art of Discussion,” Montaigne’s Essays, Book III. Renascence Editions. 
 
2 “It’s important to understand that opinions are often influenced by what we value.  This mixing 
of beliefs and values sometimes makes it difficult or confusing to assess their truth. But a good 
critical thinker’s toolkit provides the tools for tackling this seemingly tricky task” (Foresman, 
Fosl, and Watson, 2017). 
 
3 As a methodological aside, despite our concern with narrative testimony we will not need to 
engage debates in the epistemology of disagreement, or even the epistemology of testimony very 
directly in this chapter, but will rather try to remain neutral. We do not, for instance, need to 
decide between the two normative theories, the ‘concessionist’ and the ‘steadfast,’ in the 
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epistemology (see Christiansen and Lackey eds. 2013). And while our central argument that the 
religious luck ascriptions that people make illuminate epistemological issues that are really 
concerns about inductive risk might be rendered stronger if testimonial transmission is inductive, 
nothing in our approach presupposes or necessitates that we take an inductive or reductionist 
position in the epistemology of testimony.  Again we can perhaps serve the interest of connecting 
philosophy of luck to CF and CSR if we remain largely neutral on these ‘in house’ philosophical 
debates.  
 
4 Supporting this theory of modes of ritual group formation, the authors cite studies showing that, 
“traumatic ritual ordeals increase cohesion and tolerance within groups, but they also seem to 
intensify feelings of hostility and intolerance towards outgroups” (Whitehouse and McQuinn 
2013, 600). Introducing DMR theory they write, “the theory distinguishes a doctrinal mode 
characterized by routinized ritual, diffuse cohesion, hierarchical structure, and rapid 
dissemination to large populations from an imagistic mode characterized by rare and dramatic 
ritual ordeals and intense cohesion within small cults” (598). It has usually been used to explain 
the formation and spread of religious traditions, but the authors argue for its value in explaining 
association with armed groups, both religious and non-religious, engaged in civil conflicts. 
 
5 By contrast, Leo D. Lefebure in Revelation, the Religions, and Violence argues that dialogue 
and nonviolence are tightly interdependent: “The struggle to overcome violence and form a 
healthy global community is one of the strongest reasons for interreligious dialogue. Indeed, the 
series of international movements of nonviolent resistance are among the most important fruits 
of interreligious exchange… To proclaim the revelation of God in Jesus Christ today calls for 
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Christians to critically appropriate our own tradition in dialogue with other religious voices” 
(2000, 23). 
 
6 Robert C. Neville (2018, 147) holds the need to comparison even in a theological projects: “All 
serious theology should take place in and arise out of a solid grounding in the comparison of 
religious ideas. This is my hypothesis. Too many people believe that theology should be the 
reflection of religious ideas from the standpoint of a religious tradition by itself, exclusively in its 
own terms. For instance, many Christian theologians, influenced by Karl Barth, think that 
theology is a reading of the Christian word of God on its own terms without any serious mention 
of Jewish, Buddhist, Daoist, or Muslim theology. Sometimes this kind of theology is called 
“confessional” because it takes its rise from some theological starting point to which it confesses 
allegiance and then derives what follows from that. While confessional theology can be helpful 
for the fulsome expression of the implications of the theological starting point, it runs the grave 
danger of abandoning theology for intellectual sociology.” 
 
7 Liht et. al. (2011).  
 
8 If we are to parallel Hume to a considerable extent, our focus should be on rational 
credibility—in our case not of testimony to miracles as interventions in the natural order, but of 
testimonial traditions and transmissions to radically asymmetrical attributions of religious value 
to insiders and outsiders of the home religion. 
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9 Roxanne Euben’s (1999) Enemy in the Mirror focuses on Islamic fundamentalism but through 
an approach to political theory that is inherently comparative. She does not mean by this that 
movements presupposing nonrational, transcendent truths can be held to the bar of 
Enlightenment reason. Rather, Euben argues, conceptions of reason vary as do conceptions of 
faith, and a sound understanding of fundamentalism must test the scope of Western rationalist 
categories. For an advanced study of the dynamics of religious and ideological radicalization, see 
Alimi, Demetriou and Bosi, 2015. 
 
10 Jakobus Vorster points out that “the three religions of the Book,’ namely Christianity, Islam 
and Judaism have, in spite of deep-rooted differences in theology and ethics,” have a remarkable 
similarity in being “prone” to fundamentalist orientation through a propositional or literalist view 
of the contents of their scriptures, or an infallibilist view of the vehicle of revelation. 
Psychological needs condition these particularist assumptions: “Scripturalism meets the need for 
certainty and authority for many people and gives them confidence in their pursuits. The appeal 
of these fundamentalisms is great because of the use of proof-texts that are easy to understand 
and to follow. Nationalism and patriotism combined with self-centric ideals create dangerous 
forces where violence for the sake of furthering a holy agenda becomes a romantic and even 
sacral strategy of change.” Vorster, (2008), 49. 
 
11 Un-safe belief raises concerns about the cognitive and moral risks of our various faith 
ventures. This is true to varying degrees with doxastic commitments we take on in all 
controversial fields. Allen Buchanan (2013) draws attention to “credibility prejudicing” as a 
major aspect of the moral and prudential risks of our social epistemic dependency. Where the 
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New Problem of religious luck is unique is partly in focusing on the most extreme and serious of 
risky belief in this particular field, which is why I initially described my purpose in articulating it 
as a contribution of comparative religious fundamentalism. 
 
12 While most philosophy of religion textbook glossaries define fideism only in its religious and 
not also its psychological sense, David Shatz (2002, 559) laudably takes the more careful 
approach: “Fideism: (1) The view that religious belief is based on faith and not reason. (2) The 
view that religious belief should be based on faith and not reason” (italics original). The 
unequivocal “not” here likely skews Shatz’s definition to fit only strong fideism, rather than the 
full range; yet I applaud his clear recognition of the need to make the psychological/religious 
distinction. 
 
13 As J.C. Wernham correctly points out, “The ladder is not advocacy but description…If one 
compares James’ will-to-believe doctrine and the ladder, one finds differences between them and 
similarities too. The will-to-believe doctrine is advocacy” (1987, 113). This may also indicate 
that as his thinking matured James became clearer about the need to distinguish the two senses of 
the term in order to avoid an overt Is-Ought fallacy.  
 
14 For more on descriptive fideism see also Louis Pojman, (1986), chapter 9, and John Bishop 
(2007a and b). 
 
15 For more on descriptive fideism see also Louis Pojman, (1986), chapter 9, and John Bishop 
(2007a and b). 
30 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
16 Of course, this is only half the story because groups are typically cooperative internally even 
as they are competitive between groups. In evolutionary theory, social selection involves groups 
of cooperators out-competing other groups. According to Darwin in The Descent of Man (1871, 
Vol. I: 182, 179), “There can be no doubt that a tribe including  many members who [...]  are 
always ready to give aid to each other and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would 
be  victorious over other tribes; and this would be natural selection.” So the ‘defector’ analogy 
perhaps fits a relationship of competing groups, but within groups cooperation is high. Certainly 
religious groups are internally cooperative. But “primeval man,” Darwin argues, “regarded 
actions as good or bad solely as they obviously affected the welfare of the tribe, not of the 
species” and corresponding vices, if practiced on other tries, typically “are not regarded as 
crimes.” 
 
17 The strong interest in the magic circle among some game theorists draws upon Durkheim’s 
distinction between the sacred and profane. Especially as one understands Barthian fideism as an 
Independence model (more akin of Wittgenstein’s language games) the strong reading of the 
circle metaphor as a circle enclosing and separating a faith community from the rest of the world, 
fits. Much fundamentalism is isolationist, with a narrative of being the city on a hill. This shared 
interests in entry of the circle and negotiation of its borders I suggest makes discussions of digital 
games relevant. See Stenros (2014) for a fine introduction. “The magic circle of play is the social 
contract that is created through implicit or explicit social negotiation and metacommunication in 
the act of playing. This social contract can become societal as other social frameworks (law, 
economics) can recognize it…. The participants are supposed to treat the encounter within the 
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borders of the social contract as disconnected from the external world and they are not supposed 
to bring external motivations…As a contractual barrier is established, the events within the 
border are loaded with special significance.”  
 
18 While I admire his many valid criticisms of Feldman’s assumptions, the normative upshot for 
J. Adam Carter (2017), his controversial view agnosticism, is still a form of impermissivism. For 
exemplary work in support of a permissivist ethics of belief, see Haack (1997), Audi (2011), 
Kelly (2014), Kopec and Titelbaum (2016), and Booth and Peels (2014), Schoenfield (2014), and 
Simpson (2017).  Permissivists hold that “the gap between the ways in which we are meant to 
normatively assess belief and action may not be as wide as has been thought." According to 
Booth and Peels, the Permissivist Thesis holds that “responsible belief is permissible rather than 
obliged belief. On the Unique Thesis (UT), our evidence is always such that there is a unique 
doxastic attitude that we are obliged to have given that evidence, whereas the Permissibility 
Thesis (PT) denies this.” Although a fuller account of the ethics of belief and what James called 
religious “overbeliefs” is outside the purview of this book, my own work in this area has aimed 
to provide a virtue-theoretic account of permissivism, an account I term doxastic responsibilism 
(Axtell 2006, 2011a, 2011b, 2013, 2018, 2019).  
 
19 Examples of philosophers taking these positions are McCain (2008) for phenomenological 
conservativism, and Fantl (2018) and Tucker (2010) for dogmatism.  
 
20 Mutualism as a moral and epistemological thesis about mutual recognition of reasonableness 
seems to falls under permissivism. But when it is mutualist exclusivism, it is akin to a claim of 
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holding purely negative rights, rights that one cares only about their own, but allows to others 
also not on principle of desert, but only pragmatically, to secure their own. Dogmatism and 
phenomenological foundationalism are two examples of the mutualist exclusivism that is self-
titled as dogmatism or as phenomenological foundationalism. Both seem to be in bad faith in 
regard to people’s mutual recognition as each other as reasonable; for they grant the point only in 
order to justify the reasonableness of each person in denying any positive epistemic status to 
beliefs contrary to their own. Mutual steadfastness is a term we can use for the claim that higher 
order evidence, including evidence of peer disagreement, need not be taken as being 
epistemically significant. The agent is fully reasonable in maintaining their pre-existing degree 
of confidence towards the first-order propositions that the disagreement is about. This claim may 
be permissivist if qualified to that it need not have such an impact. Few defenders of 
steadfastness claim we should never allow higher-order evidence to change first-order views 
antecedently held. But strong religious fideism and the broader position simply called 
“dogmatism” seem to me to come close to embracing this absurdity. I would remind the reader 
of Jean Jacques Rousseau’s famous claim, “Those who would separate civil from theological 
intolerance are, to my mind, mistaken. The two are inseparable.” In development of this, William 
James spoke of the spirit of inner toleration that empiricism promotes, and that he hoped a 
science of religion together with philosophy of religion could promote: “No one of us ought to 
issue vetoes to the other, nor should we bandy words of abuse. We ought, on the contrary, 
delicately and profoundly to respect one another's mental freedom: then only shall we bring 
about the intellectual republic; then only shall we have that spirit of inner tolerance without 
which all our outer tolerance is soulless, and which is empiricism's glory; then only shall we live 
and let live, in speculative as well as in practical things.”  
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21 The appeal to supernatural or final causes as trumping any and all philosophical and scientific 
standards of epistemic risk does not provide an avenue for by-passing inductive normativity as 
based on shared, observable proximate causes. It always carries the rider, ‘in the home religion 
but not others,’ which is itself an asymmetry that demands neutral criteria if not to be seen as but 
an article of faith. This is a retreat from reason and accountability for faith-based commitments. 
Such theologically cast, religion-specific appeals to final causes as discounting shared, neutral 
evidence, are inevitably claims that ‘the pattern stops here’; but doing so marks it as an 
authority-based claim or a fideistic article of faith. This objectively, i.e., in the shared natural and 
social world we inhabit, increases the alethic and epistemic (and potentially also, moral) 
riskiness of the faith ventures based on such assumptions. One can say that ‘metaphysics is first 
philosophy,’ but from the interest of neutrality where truth claims need to be justified and not 
simply assumed, this as I argue is descriptively an instance of testimonial authority assumption, a 
clear marker of religious fideism. 
 
22 Employment of such informal fallacies points us to the rhetorical dimensions of the ‘culture 
wars’ over science and religion, and typically to voices defending the least defensible positions 
on each side of the debate. When I refer to our ‘culture wars’ over science and religion, this 
should not be taken to suggest that I support a Conflict or ‘warfare’ model. Indeed I defend a 
Dialogue model and try to develop its advantages in Axtell (2013). 
 
23 Thagard (2011), 164. Ken Manktelow (2012) explains how centrally important in experimental 
psychology is the distinction between reasoning and thinking. It makes possible the testing of 
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agents against logical norms – the Normative-Descriptive Gap – and the better recognition of 
heuristic strategies and ecological on the part of agents rather than ideal rationality. The “new 
paradigm” as Manktelow and other psychologists describe it aims to integrate the study of 
reasoning and decision-making. It recognizes lots of traffic between the traditional precincts of 
theoretical and practical reason. My complaint about a lot of what goes under epistemology of 
disagreement fails to make these crucial distinction. The objection I would make is that whether 
they hail from skeptical or religious evidentialism, the broader approach that they take is 
extensionally inadequate. Evidentialists like Richard Feldman I think do so by reducing human 
thinking to an argument model. Christian evidentialists like Richard Swinburne and phenomenal 
foundationalists like Kevin McCain (2018) do so by reducing norms of good evidential 
reasoning to simple conservation of the agent’s phenomenological seemings. As Paul Sands 
rightly points out, “One might say that evidentialism sacrifices faith on the altar of probabilism, 
while fideism substitutes self-assertion for adjudication when challenged by religious pluralism” 
(147). Note that the objections I present (2011) to Feldman and Conee’s explicitly epistemic 
evidentialism are meant to be complemented by my direct response (Axtell 2018) to the over-
weaning moral evidentialism of Scott Aikin and Rob Talisse (2018). Both parties I think mis-
apply the Rational Uniqueness Thesis to the epistemology of controversial views, but I can only 
hope to write a book on these issues in the near future. 
 
24 Kidd (2016), 183. 
 
25 Kidd notes the ubiquity of “vice-charging” in social contexts outside of religion, 
acknowledging that it can often be intended to promote responsibility. Kidd’s distinction is valid 
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in many contexts, but may be less clear where religious value attributions reflect religious 
teachings and alternative theological methods. Part of the asymmetry between religious luck 
attributions is that while the in-group’s good luck is usually attributed to God’s will, the religious 
outsider’s bad religious luck is typically attended with vice-charging. Still, there are definite 
differences in the extent to which adherents of alternative models of faith are committed to 
interfaith dialogue, and to positive as contrasted with merely negative apologetics. 
 
26 The concept of confabulation should be related back to our discussion of contingency anxiety 
in Chapter 1. Contingency anxiety could be taken as descriptive of what agents self-report, but 
when one adopts a normative conception of rationality and applies it to experimental design, we 
are using a normative account of rationality. What should induce some contingency anxiety, as 
we discussed with the epistemic location thought experiments, is ignoring formal symmetries of 
belief acquisition and maintenance with epistemic peers. Arguably, the failure of rationality in 
the agent who identifies religious truth with content such that etiological challenges are like 
water off a duck’s back, is a failure to abide by inductive norms that operate in other domains of 
our social world. 
 
27 For new work in virtue-theoretic approaches in philosophy of religion, see Callahan and 
O’Connor eds. (2014). One strong overlap between Vainio and myself is a strong emphasis on 
virtue theory as championing diachronic, in contrast to only synchronic justification of beliefs 
(Vainio 2010, 142-3; Axtell 2011). Of course this is consistent with naturalism’s focus on the 
reliable etiology of belief, which in turn makes inductive norms salient for all forms of a 
posteriori knowledge. Vainio finds that “in religion people rarely if ever use synchronic 
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justification for their beliefs. The synchronic view of religious beliefs is like a static snapshot, 
whereas the diachronic view takes beliefs as a sort of narrative that develops over time….The 
belief system does not rest on a single basis but it is a complex mixture of experiences, truth 
claims, witnesses, and other data.” (143). I take this to correctly hold that beliefs core to one’s 
religious identity needs to be supported holistically, not atomistically or as a matter of 
‘synchronic fit.’ That is a view I have also defended. 
 
28 Vainio makes this point clearly, as did Thomas D. Carroll (2008) in another careful, 
historically informed discussion. As Vainio comments, “to Carroll the problems regarding the 
concepts of fideism are due to its common pejorative use, the lack of historical precision…and 
the complex philosophical background of the concept itself” (3). Vainio seems to note, but I 
would emphasize, that those for whom the term is used in a pejorative way are not just those 
with a skeptical bent, but often those to whom one in historical perspective one might suppose to 
fit its objective description. This is pure Alvin Plantinga, who seems to me rhetorically to define 
“fideism” by its most anti-rationality extreme, in order to easily dismiss the description of 
reformed theology as a form of fideism.  
 
29 Ninian Smart, Worldviews: Crosscultural Explorations of Human Beliefs (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1995). “Interfaith movements can engage fundamentalism in a more positive 
fashion.  ‘Fundamentalism’ functions as a heuristic device teasing into relief typological ‘family 
resemblances’ that unite religious protest movements across the globe. Militant Zionism, 
political Islam, Hindu nationalism, and sectarian Buddhism all share ‘generic characteristics’ that 
invite comparative treatment. Using ‘fundamentalism’ as a cross-cultural analytical category, this 
37 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
approach views fundamentalism not as an aberration but as one religious phenomenon among 
others.” http://www.crosscurrents.org/Huff.htm 
 
30 James W. Jones (2013, 391-392). “Religions almost always idealize and sanctify some ideas, 
beliefs, institutions, books, codes of conduct, or various leaders…. So denoting something as 
sacred appears to have significant emotional and behavioral consequences even when that 
something is the jihad, ending abortion, turning the United States into a biblical theocracy, 
restoring the boundaries of biblical Israel, purifying the Hindu homeland, or converting the 
Tamils to Buddhism.” 
 
31 Juergensmeyer (2003, 242). That religious studies scholars and theologians themselves may 
refer to an active role of religious imagination in the fostering and transmission of religious ideas 
does not assume that personality traits are sufficient for understanding why people adopt or do 
not adopt religious orientations. No single factor could explain something as complex as 
religious orientation or religious radicalization, but individual factors can still play an important 
role. Social-psychological analyses may be necessary to understand things like ritual identity, 
religious violence, etc., even though not sufficient. Religious imagination from any scholarly 
approach needs to be recognized as playing a role in the home religion if it is seen as playing a 
role in alien religions. But too often talk of imagination, like talk of historical critical methods of 
scriptural interpretation, is rejected outright by those of fundamentalism orientation because 
inconsistent with the literalism and inerrantism of their view. 
 
38 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
32 See Fricker, M. (2007) Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. On the 
psychological and epistemic motivations for religious violence, see also Marbaniang 2008. 
 
33 McKim (2012), 152.  
 
34 As one theologian aptly put it, I do not believe in miracles because I have proved them, but I 
forever try to prove them because I believe them. 
 
35 One might think here of Mill’s Method of Difference as an inductive norm.  
 
36 Quassim Cassam’s approach to “the epistemology of terrorism and counter-terrorism” (2018, 
forthcoming) focuses not on prediction, but on “making the turn to violence intelligible in 
specific cases…without any expectation of general laws or the ability to predict violence. It 
works backwards from effects to causes and, instead of positing generic psychological 
mechanisms to explain why some people carry out acts of terrorism, emphasizes the extent to 
which pathways to terrorism tend to be highly individual, idiosyncratic and contingent.” The 
holy of counterterrorism he says has been “prediction, and governments and intelligence 
agencies are attracted by the idea that radicalisation predicts political violence. [On this view] … 
the key to explaining the turn to political violence is to understand ‘the radicalisation process.’”  
By contrast, as a self-described epistemic particularist Cassam thinks that there is no general 
answer to the question of what leads persons to turn to political violence. While I worry that 
epistemic particularism shares the content-focused ‘can’t compare across traditions’ thesis with 
post-liberal theologians, and against CSR, Cassam makes a useful distinction that may bring us 
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closer: “In its most extreme form epistemic particularism would deny the existence of any 
interesting generalisations about the turn to political violence. In its more moderate form 
epistemic particularism allows that there may be such generalisations but insists that they are of 
limited value when it comes to understanding the actions of a specific individuals.”  
 
37 Rawlsian “reasonable pluralism” I see as based negatively upon the burdens of judgment, and 
positively on agents’ holistic reasons for adopting a religious identity, whether in a testimonial 
faith tradition or something less traditional but still potentially a “comprehensive doctrine” 
covering all recognize values within a systematically articulated system or worldview. It is 
important to note that the argument for Rawlsian reasonable comprehensive conceptions is 
explicitly political, and that the burdens of judgment are epistemic. Now Rawls and Rorty both 
do connect the dialogical principles or criteria of reciprocity that supports behind pluralism to a 
demand for “privatization” of religious belief in the sense of it being just to keep religious belief 
out of the public sphere. But that is a different argument and one that should not rely on such 
broad generalizations. The personal and the private are not the same, and personal or experiential 
aspects of spirituality do not subjectivize the object of faith, or contrast it with collective life. 
Both authors should be seen as adhering to what Rorty calls the “Jeffersonian Compromise,” 
though they both perhaps exaggerate how directly relevant their describing religion as, in a 
liberal democracy, a personal search for perfection, answers that question of religion and politics. 
Much debate about democracy and moral paternalism, the establishment clause, and other 
questions would have to come between. So my presentation of the inductive risk account, and 
my use of the Rawlsian notion of “reasonable pluralism” is largely neutral to that whole debate 
about the place of religion in the public sphere. 
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38 Partly what is meant by “radical” fideism is an absolutistic bent, whether it be more cognitive 
(demand for creedal assent) or practical (demand that everyone live under Sharia law). 
 
39  Kierkegaard continues, “For I should very much like to know how one would bring 
Abraham's act into relation with the universal, and whether it is possible to discover any 
connection whatever between what Abraham did and the universal … except the fact that he 
transgressed it.” 
 
40 Brunner 1937, 155. See Blanshard’s (Chapter vii) discussion of Brunner and Barth’s central 
role in the post-liberal turn.  
 
41 Bernard Williams, “Tolerance: An Impossible Virtue?” Many fundamentalists traditionally 
viewed politics as anathema and were isolationist, but may have displayed benevolent attitudes 
when circumstances forced their interaction with broader society. 
 
42 It appears that “friendly” atheism and theism (see Greco 2008) may be described as a de facto 
position independent of a de jure one. For instance, say that I hold that evidence and argument 
best supports theism (or atheism), but not that others, given the trait-dependence of both of our 
views, are necessarily unreasonable or outside their intellectual rights to hold a contrary view. 
One of the best things about contraries is that they can both be wrong! I see no reason why a 
narrow-target de jure objection like our own against exclusivism cannot be combined with a de 
facto objection to theism that find no justification for censuring theism, or deism, or pantheism, 
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etc. more generally. Indeed, such a combination may be how Rawlsian reasonable pluralism is 
best motivated, since Rawls’ view is permissivist, yet has the ‘teeth’ to censure the 
unreasonability of the those who eschew their burdens of judgment the putting the culturally 
particular above the universal: those ‘discontents’ of Rawlsian reasonable pluralism. 
 
43 Montaigne, Essays book 1.9, ebooks@Adelaide. 
 
44 I do not find comparative philosophers of religion to be drawing as readily as they might from 
the empirical studies of CSR. From the other direction, “religious orientation” as studied by 
psychologists proceeds without the focus on symmetry or asymmetry of trait-ascriptions that 
philosophy of luck/risk brings to bear. But the new research questions that I hope will serve to 
more closely connect these two fields of study are ones we have already laid the basis for: they 
are questions informed by close study of how religious groups make and justify asymmetrical 
ascriptions of religious truth or value to group insiders and outsiders. They connect with 
problems of religious luck, and still more directly with modes of belief acquisition and 
maintenance that are cognitively unsafe (because inductively risky), or morally dubious (because 
of the attitudes towards religious outsiders they engender, and the irresponsibility of risking 
others besides oneself through one’s doxastic faith ventures).  
